Exchange market equilibria with Leontief’s utility: Freedom of pricing leads to rationality  by Ye, Yinyu
Theoretical Computer Science 378 (2007) 134–142
www.elsevier.com/locate/tcs
Exchange market equilibria with Leontief’s utility: Freedom of
pricing leads to rationalityI
Yinyu Ye∗
Department of Management Science and Engineering, School of Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA
Abstract
This paper studies the equilibrium property and algorithmic complexity of the exchange market equilibrium problem with
concave piecewise linear functions, which include linear and Leontief’s utility functions as special cases. We show that the Fisher
model again reduces to the weighted analytic center problem, and the same linear programming complexity bound applies to
computing its equilibrium. However, the story for the Arrow–Debreu model with Leontief’s utility becomes quite different. We
show that, for the first time, solving this class of Leontief exchange economies is equivalent to solving a linear complementarity
problem whose algorithmic complexity is finite but not polynomially bounded.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
This paper studies the equilibrium property and algorithmic complexity of the Arrow–Debreu competitive
equilibrium problem. In this problem, traders go to the market with initial endowments of commodities and utility
functions. They sell and buy commodities to maximize their individual utilities under a market clearing price. Arrow
and Debreu [1] have proved, under mild conditions, the existence of equilibrium prices when utility functions are
concave and commodities are divisible. From then on, finding an efficient algorithm for computing a equilibrium
price became an attractive research area; see [2,4,6–10,15–17,22,24,28].
Consider a special case of the Arrow–Debreu problem, the Fisher exchange market model, where traders are
divided into two sets: producer and consumer. Consumers have money to buy goods and maximize their individual
utility functions of goods; producers sell their goods only for money (their utility functions are increasing and
concave functions of money only). A price equilibrium is an assignment of prices to goods so that when every
consumer buys a maximal bundle of goods then the market clears, meaning that all the money is spent and all the
goods are sold. Eisenberg and Gale [12,13] gave a convex optimization setting to formulate Fisher’s problem with
linear and Leontief’s utilities. They constructed an aggregated concave objective function that is maximized at the
equilibrium. Thus, finding an equilibrium became solving a convex optimization problem, which can be done by
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using the Ellipsoid method or interior-point algorithms in polynomial time. Here, polynomial time means that one can
compute an -approximate equilibrium in a number of arithmetic operations bounded by a polynomial in n and log 1

.
On the other hand, Eaves [9] proved that the general Arrow–Debreu model with linear utilities could be solved as a
linear complementarity problem (LCP) (see, e.g., Cottle et al. [5] and Saigal [23]) in finite time but not polynomially
bounded.
It has turned out that the more general Arrow–Debreu problem with linear utilities is also equivalent to a convex
optimization problem (see, e.g., Nenakhov and Primak [21] and Jain [15]). The best arithmetic operation complexity
bound for solving both the Fisher and the Arrow–Debreu problems with linear utilities is O(n4 log 1

); see [28].
Moreover, if the input data are rational, then an exact solution can be obtained by solving a system of linear equations
and inequalities when  < 2−L , where L is the bit-length of the input data. Thus, the arithmetic operation bound
becomes O(n4L), which is in line with the best complexity bound for linear programming of the same dimension and
size.
In this paper we deal with a class of more general utility functions: concave piecewise linear functions, which
include Leontief’s utility. We show that the Fisher model again reduces to the general analytic center model discussed
in [28]. Thus, the same linear programming complexity bound applies to approximating the Fisher equilibrium with
this utility. We also show that the solution to a (pairing) class of the Arrow–Debreu model with Leontief’s utility
can be decomposed into solutions of two systems of linear equalities and inequalities, and its price vector is the
Perron–Frobenius eigenvector of a scaled Leontief utility matrix. Consequently, if all input data are rational, then
there always exists a rational Arrow–Debreu equilibrium, that is, the entries of the equilibrium vector are rational
numbers. Additionally, the size (bit-length) of the equilibrium solution is bounded by the size of the input data. This
result is interesting since rationality does not hold for Leontief’s utility in general. Perhaps more importantly, it also
implies, for the first time, that solving this class Arrow–Debreu model with Leontief’s utility is also equivalent to
solving a linear complementarity problem where its algorithmic complexity is finite but not polynomially bounded.
2. The Fisher equilibrium problem
Without loss of generality, assume that there is 1 unit of goods from each producer j ∈ P with |P| = n. Let
consumer i ∈ C (with |C | = m) have an initial money endowment wi to spend and buy goods to maximize his or her
concave piecewise linear utility function:
ui (xi ) = min
k
{uki (xi )}, (1)
where uki (xi ) is a linear function in xi j—the amount of goods bought from producer j by consumer i , j = 1, . . . , n,
and k is the number of linear function pieces. More precisely,
uki (xi ) = (uki )Txi =
∑
j∈P
uki j xi j .
In particular, Leontief’s utility function is the one with
uki (xi ) =
xik
aik
, k ∈ P and aik > 0,
that is, vector uki is an all-zero vector except for the kth entry that equals 1/aik .
We make the following assumptions temporarily: every consumer’s initial money endowment wi > 0, at least one
uki j > 0 for every k and i ∈ C and at least one uki j > 0 for every k and j ∈ P . This is to say that every consumer in the
market has money to spend and he or she likes at least one good; and every good is valued by at least one consumer.
We will see that, with these assumptions, each consumer can have a positive utility value at equilibrium. If a consumer
has zero budget or his or her utility has zero value for every good, then buying nothing is an optimal solution for him
or her so that he or she can be removed from the market; if a good has zero value to every consumer, then it is a “free”
good with zero price in a price equilibrium and can be arbitrarily distributed among the consumers so that it can be
removed from the market too.
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For given prices p j on good j , consumer i’s maximization problem is
maximize ui (xi1, . . . , xin)
subject to
∑
j∈P
p j xi j ≤ wi ,
xi j ≥ 0, ∀ j.
(2)
Let x∗i denote a maximal solution vector of (2). Then, vector p is called Fisher price equilibrium if there exists an x∗i
for each consumer such that∑
i∈C
x∗i = e
where e is the vector of all ones representing available goods on the exchange market.
Problem (2) can be rewritten as a linear program, after introducing a scalar variable ui ,
maximize ui
subject to
∑
j∈P
p j xi j ≤ wi ,
ui −
∑
j∈P
uki j xi j ≤ 0, ∀k,
ui , xi j ≥ 0, ∀ j.
(3)
Besides (ui , xi ) being feasible, the optimality conditions of (3) are
λi p j −
∑
k
piki u
k
i j ≥ 0, ∀ j ∈ P∑
k
piki = 1
λiwi = ui .
(4)
for some λi , piki ≥ 0.
It has been shown by Eisenberg and Gale [12,11,13] (later independently by Codenotti et al. [3]) that a Fisher price
equilibrium is an optimal Lagrangian multiplier vector of an aggregated convex optimization problem:
maximize
∑
i∈C
wi log ui
subject to
∑
i∈C
xi j = 1, ∀ j ∈ P,
ui −
∑
j∈P
uki j xi j ≤ 0, ∀k, i ∈ C,
ui , xi j ≥ 0, ∀i, j.
(5)
Conversely, an optimal Lagrangian multiplier vector is also a Fisher price equilibrium, which can be seen from the
optimality conditions of (5):
p j −
∑
k
piki u
k
i j ≥ 0, ∀i, j
piki
(∑
j∈P
uki j xi j − ui
)
= 0, ∀i, k
xi j
(
p j −
∑
k
piki u
k
i j
)
= 0, ∀i, j
ui
∑
k
piki = wi , ∀i.
(6)
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for some p j , the Lagrangian multiplier of equality constraint of j ∈ P , and some piki ≥ 0, the Lagrangian multiplier
of inequality constraint of i ∈ C and k. Summing the second constraint over k we have
wi =
∑
k
piki ui =
∑
k
piki
∑
j∈P
uki j xi j =
∑
j∈P
(
xi j
∑
k
piki u
k
i j
)
, ∀i;
then summing the third constraint over j we have∑
j∈P
p j xi j =
∑
j∈P
(
xi j
∑
k
piki u
k
i j
)
= wi .
This implies that xi from the aggregate problem is feasible for (3). Moreover, note that piki in (6) equals pi
k
i /λi in (4).
Thus, finding a Fisher price equilibrium is equivalent to finding an optimal Lagrangian multiplier of (5).
In particular, if each uki (xi ) has the Leontief utility form, i.e.
uki (xi ) =
xik
aik
, ∀k ∈ P and aik > 0.
Then, upon using ui to replace variable xi j , the aggregated convex optimization problem can be simplified to
maximize
∑
i
wi log ui
subject to ATu ≤ e,
u ≥ 0;
(7)
with the Leontief utility matrix
A =

a11 a12 · · · a1n
a21 a22 · · · a2n
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
am1 am2 · · · amn
 and variable vector u =

u1
u2
· · ·
um
 . (8)
Here, we assume that
Assumption 1. A has no all-zero row, that is, every trader likes at least one good.
With this assumption, we see that the feasible set of (7) is bounded so that the first-order optimality or KKT
conditions exist. Moreover, the feasible set has a non-empty (relative) interior, that is, it has a u such that all inequalities
are held strictly.
3. The weighted analytic center problem
In [28] the Eisenberg–Gale aggregated problem was related to the (linear) analytic center problem studied in
interior-point algorithms
maximize
n∑
j=1
w j log(x j ) (9)
subject to Ax = b,
x ≥ 0,
where the given A is an m × n-dimensional matrix with full row rank, b is an m-dimensional vector and w j is the
non-negative weight on the j th variable. Any x that satisfies the constraints is called a primal feasible solution, while
any optimal solution to the problem is called a weighted analytic center.
If the weighted analytic center problem has an optimal solution, the optimality conditions are
Sx = w,
Ax = b, x ≥ 0,
−ATy + s = 0, s ≥ 0,
(10)
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where y and s are the Lagrangian multipliers or dual variables and slacks of the dual linear program:
min bTy subject to s = ATy ≥ 0,
and S is the diagonal matrix with slack vector s on its diagonals.
Let the feasible set of (9) be bounded and have a (relative) interior, i.e. have a strictly feasible point x > 0 with
Ax = b (which clearly holds for problem (5) and (7)). Then, there is a strictly feasible dual solution s > 0 with
s = ATy for some y. Furthermore, [28], based on the literature of interior-point algorithms (e.g. Megiddo and Kojima
et al. [20,19] and Gu¨ler [14]), has shown that
Theorem 1. Let A, b be fixed and consider a solution (x(w), y(w), s(w)) of (10) as a mapping of w ≥ 0 with∑
j w j = 1. Then,
• The mapping of Sn++ = {x > 0 ∈ Rn : eTx = 1} to F++ = {(x > 0, y, s > 0) : Ax = b, s = ATy} is one-to-one
and continuously differentiable.
• The mapping of Sn+ = {x ≥ 0 ∈ Rn : eTx = 1} to F+ = {(x ≥ 0, y, s ≥ 0) : Ax = b, s = ATy} is upper
semi-continuous.
• The pair (x j (w), s j (w)) is unique for any j ∈ W = { j : w j > 0}, and
x ′j (w)s′′j (w) = x ′′j (w)s′j (w) = 0, ∀ j 6∈ W
and for any two solutions (x ′(w), y′(w), s′(w)) and (x ′′(w), y′′(w), s′′(w)) of (10).
From this theorem, we see that, in the Fisher equilibrium problem (5) or (7), ui (w), the utility value of each
consumer, is unique; but the price vector p(w) can be non-unique.
In addition, a modified primal-dual path-following algorithm was developed in [28], for computing an -solution
for any  > 0:
‖Sx − w‖ ≤ ,
Ax = b, x ≥ 0,
−ATy + s = 0, s ≥ 0.
(11)
Theorem 2. The primal-dual interior-point algorithm solves the weighted analytic center problem (9) in
O(
√
n log(nmax(w)/)) iterations and each iteration solves a system of linear equations in O(nm2+m3) arithmetic
operations. If Karmarkar’s rank-one update technique [18] is used, the average arithmetic operations per iteration
can be reduced to O(n1.5m).
A rounding algorithm is also developed for certain types of problems possessing a rational solution, and the total
iteration bound would be O(
√
nL) and the average arithmetic operation bound would be O(n1.5m) per iteration,
where L is the bit-length of the input data A, b, w. These results indicate that the complexity of the Fisher equilibrium
problem with concave piecewise linear utility functions is completely in line with linear programming of the same
dimension and size.
4. The Arrow–Debreu equilibrium problem
The Arrow–Debreu exchange market equilibrium problem was first formulated by Le´on Walras in 1874 [26]. In
this problem everyone in a population of m traders has an initial endowment of a divisible goods and a utility function
for consuming all goods—their own and others’. Every trader sells the entire initial endowment and then uses the
revenue to buy a bundle of goods such that his or her utility function is maximized. Walras asked whether prices could
be set for everyone’s goods such that this is possible. An answer was given by Arrow and Debreu in 1954 [1] who
showed that, under mild conditions, such equilibrium would exist if the utility functions were concave.
We consider a special class of Arrow–Debreu’s problems, where each of the m = n traders has exactly one unit of
a divisible good for trade (e.g. see [15,28]), and let trader i , i = 1, . . . ,m, bring good j = i and have the concave
piecewise linear utility function of (1). We call this class of problems the pairing class. The main difference between
Fisher’s and Arrow–Debreu’ models is that, in the latter, each trader is both producer and consumer and the initial
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endowment wi of trader i is not given and will be the price assigned to his or her good i . Nevertheless, we can still
write a (parametric) convex optimization model
maximize
∑
i
wi log ui
subject to
∑
i
xi j = 1, ∀ j,
ui ≤
∑
j
uki j xi j , ∀i, k,
ui , xi j ≥ 0, ∀i, j,
(12)
where we wish to select weights wi ’s such that an optimal Lagrangian multiplier vector p equals w. It is easily seen
that any optimal Lagrangian multiplier vector p satisfies
p ≥ 0 and eT p = eTw.
For fixed uki j , let p be a map from w, say p(w). Then, the mapping is from S
n+ to Sn+, and it is upper semi-continuous
by Theorem 1. Thus, from the Kakutani fixed-point theorem (see, e.g., [24,25,27]), we have
Theorem 3. There exists a w ∈ Sn+ such that an Lagrangian multiplier vector p(w) = w for problem (12) if its
feasible region is bounded and has a non-empty (relative) interior.
We now focus on the Arrow–Debreu equilibrium with the Leontief utility function:
uki (xi ) =
xik
aik
, ∀k = 1, . . . ,m,
where we temporarily assume aik > 0 for all i and k so that there exists at least one Arrow–Debreu equilibrium [1].
Recall the parametric convex optimization model (7) where the Leontief utility matrix A of (8) is an m × m positive
matrix. Let p ∈ Rm be an optimal Lagrangian multiplier vector of the constraints. Then, we have
ui
∑
j
ai j p j = wi ∀i, and p j
(
1−
∑
i
ai jui
)
= 0 ∀ j,∑
i
ai jui ≤ 1 ∀ j, and ui , p j ≥ 0 ∀i, j;
or in matrix form
U Ap = w,
P(e − ATu) = 0,
ATu ≤ e,
u, p ≥ 0,
where U and P are diagonal matrices whose diagonal entries are u and p, respectively.
Note that the Arrow–Debreu equilibrium p ∈ Rm , together with u ∈ Rm , must satisfy
U Ap = p,
P(e − ATu) = 0,
ATu ≤ e,
u, p ≥ 0,
p 6= 0.
(13)
In the general case where 0 ≤ A 6> 0, using Model (7) and Theorem 3 we can prove:
Corollary 1. System (13) always has a solution (u, p) under Assumption 1 (i.e., A has no all-zero row).
We comment that a solution to System (13) may not be an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium, although every Arrow–Debreu
equilibrium satisfies System (13).
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5. Characterization of an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium
If ui > 0 at a solution (u, p 6= 0) of System (13), we must have pi > 0, that is, trader i’s good must be priced
positively in order to have a positive utility value. On the other hand, pi > 0 implies that
∑m
k akiuk = 1, that is, goods
i must be all consumed and gone. Conversely, if pi > 0, we must have ui > 0, that is, trader i’s utility value must be
positive. Thus, there is a partition of all traders (or goods) such that
B = {i : pi > 0} and N = {i : pi = 0}
where the union of B and N is {1, 2, . . . ,m}. Then, (u, p) satisfies
(UB ABB)pB = pB,
ATBBuB = e,
ATBNuB ≤ e,
uB, pB > 0.
Here ABB is the principal submatrix of A corresponding to the index set B, ABN is the submatrix of A with rows in
B and columns in N . Similarly, uB and pB are subvectors of u and p with entries in B, respectively.
Since the scaled Leontief matrix UB ABB is a (column) stochastic matrix (i.e. eTUB ABB = eT), pB must be the
(right) Perron–Frobenius eigenvector of UB ABB . Moreover, ABB is irreducible because UB ABB is irreducible and
uB > 0, and UB ABB is irreducible because pB > 0. To summarize, we have
Theorem 4. Let B ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n}, N = {1, 2, . . . , n} \ B, ABB be irreducible, and uB satisfy the linear system
ATBBuB = e, ATBNuB ≤ e, and uB > 0.
Then the (right) Perron–Frobenius eigenvector pB of UB ABB together with pN = 0 will be a solution to System (13).
And the converse is also true. Moreover, there is always a rational solution for every such B, that is, the entries of
price vector are rational numbers, if the entries of A are rational. Furthermore, the size (bit-length) of the solution is
bounded by the size (bit-length) of A.
Proof. In the first statement we only need to prove pB > 0. But this is the result of the Perron–Frobenius theorem
applied to UB ABB since it is irreducible. Conversely, if (pB > 0, pN = 0) is a price vector for System (13), then
uB > 0 and ATBBuB = e from the complementarity, andUB ABB is irreducible from pB > 0. The last fact implies that
ABB is irreducible since multiplication by the positive diagonal matrix UB does not alter the irreducibility of ABB .
To prove the rationality, we see that there is a rational vector uB for the linear system, so that matrix UB ABB will
be rational, hence there will be a rational price solution pB to the linear system
(UB ABB − I ) pB = 0, eT pB = 1, pB > 0.
The size result is due to that the sizes of these two linear systems are bounded by the size of A. 
Our theorem implies that the traders in block B can trade among themselves and keep others goods “free”. In
particular, if one trader likes his or her own good more than any other good, that is, ai i ≥ ai j for all j , then ui = 1/ai i ,
pi = 1, and u j = p j = 0 for all j 6= i , that is, B = {i}, makes an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium. The theorem thus
establishes, for the first time, a combinatorial algorithm to compute an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium with Leontief’s
utility by finding a right block B 6= ∅, which is actually a non-trivial solution (u 6= 0) to an LCP problem
ATu + v = e, uTv = 0, 0 6= u, v ≥ 0. (14)
If A > 0, then any complementary solution u 6= 0, together with its support B = { j : u j > 0}, of (14)
induce an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium that is the (right) Perron–Frobenius eigenvector of UB ABB , and it can be
computed in polynomial time by solving a linear equation. Even if A 6> 0, any complementary solution u 6= 0
and B = { j : u j > 0}, as long as ABB is irreducible, induces an equilibrium for System (13). The equivalence
between the pairing Arrow–Debreu model and the LCP also implies
Corollary 2. LCP (14) always has a non-trivial solution, where ABB is irreducible with B = { j : u j > 0}, under
Assumption 1 (i.e. A has no all-zero row).
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If Assumption 1 does not hold, the corollary may not be true; see example below:
AT =
(
0 2
0 1
)
.
We comment that the pairing class of Arrow–Debreu’s problems is a rather restrictive class of problems. Consider
a general supply matrix 0 ≤ G ∈ Rm×n where row i of G represents the multiple goods brought to the market by
trader i , i = 1, . . . ,m. Then the pairing model represents the case that G = I , the identity matrix, or G = P where
P is any permutation matrix of m × m.
What to do if one trader brings two different goods? One solution is to copy the same trader’s utility function twice
and treat the trader as two traders with an identical Leontief utility function, where each of them brings only one type
of good. Then, the problem reduces to the pairing model. Thus, we have
Corollary 3. If all goods are different from each other in the general Arrow–Debreu problem with Leontief’s utility,
i.e. each column of G ∈ Rm×n has exactly one positive entry, then there is always a rational equilibrium, that is, the
entries of a price vector are rational numbers.
Now what to do if two traders bring the same type of goods? In our present pairing class, they will be treated as two
different goods, and one can set the same utility coefficients to them so that they receive an identical appreciation
from all the traders. Again, the problem reduces to the pairing class, which leads to rationality. The difference is that
now these two “same” goods may receive two different prices; for example, one is priced higher and the other is at a
discount level. This could happen in the real world since two “same” goods may not be really the same and the market
does have “freedom” to price them.
6. An illustrative example
The rationality result is interesting since the existence of a rational equilibrium is not true for Leontief’s utility
in Fisher’s model with rational data, as shown by the following example converted in Arrow–Debreu’s setting, with
three consumers each of whom has 1 unit money (the first good) and two other goods (the second and third) brought
by a seller (the fourth trader) who is only interested in money, adapted from Codenotti et al. [3] and Eaves [9].
A =

0 1 12
0 12 1
0 14
1
5
1 0 0
 and G =

1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 1
 .
There is a unique equilibrium for this example, where the utility values of the three consumers are u∗1 = 23√3 ,
u∗2 = 13 + 13√3 , u∗3 =
10
3 − 103√3 , and the utility value of the seller u∗4 = 3. The equilibrium price for goods 1
(money) is p∗1 = 1, and for other two goods are p∗2 = 3(
√
3− 1), and p∗3 = 3(2−
√
3).
However, if we treat the money from each consumer differently, that is, let
A =

0 0 0 1 12
0 0 0 12 1
0 0 0 14
1
5
1 1 1 0 0
 and G =

1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1
 .
Then, there are multiple rational equilibriums and here are a few:
1. B = {1, 4}, with u∗1 = u∗4 = 1 and p∗1 = p∗4 = 1, and u∗2 = u∗3 = p∗2 = p∗3 = p∗5 = 0;
2. B = {2, 5}, with u∗2 = u∗4 = 1 and p∗2 = p∗5 = 1, and u∗1 = u∗3 = p∗1 = p∗3 = p∗4 = 0;
3. B = {3, 4}, with u∗3 = 4 and u∗4 = 1 and p∗3 = p∗4 = 1, and u∗1 = u∗2 = p∗1 = p∗2 = p∗5 = 0;
4. B = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, with an equilibrium u∗1 = 1130 , u∗2 = 3160 , u∗3 = 32 , u∗4 = 1, p∗1 = 6680 , p∗2 = 9380 , p∗3 = 8180 and
p∗4 = p∗5 = 32 .
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